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The Price of Citizenship: Corporations, Congress and Mineral Depletion in 1969 
 
In March of 2010 Topeka, capital of Kansas, decided to unofficially rename itself 
“Google” for a month, Topekans, for a brief month, agreeing to be transmogrified into 
Google-ians so that the technology behemoth would install extremely high-speed Internet 
for free. Bill Bunten, mayor of Topeka, saw his courtship of Google as a way to 
transform the image of his small Midwestern city, attract a younger demographic and 
thus incubate innovative businesses in the area.1 At about the same time, the Supreme 
Court suspended the limits corporations could spend on political advertisements. The 
majority of the Supreme Court justices argued in Citizens United v. Federal Elections 
Commission that corporations are protected by the same First Amendment freedoms as 
American citizens. Critics of the decision, the President Obama among them, condemned 
the decision on the basis of the inevitable erosion of democracy as a result of it, while 
supporters encouraged the democratization of information that would better allow the 
voter to make an educated decision in an election.2  
 
The naming of a city for a corporation recalls another period in history when 
vastly wealthy corporations dominated entire towns and cities and transformed the 
denizens of these regions into citizens of what were essentially corporate fiefdoms. In the 
same way, the idea that a corporation can have the right to sway voter opinion or punish 
intransigent politicians in the same way as regular citizens might is highly disconcerting. 
It seems that corporations have the potential to be, simultaneously, benign sponsors of 
                                                        
1 Sutter, CNN Tech. CNN Online, 2 March, 2010. 
2 Kirkpatick, New York Times. New York Times, 21 January, 2010. 
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community and adversaries of democracy. This conflicted view of the corporation is not a 
new phenomenon in American history. Rather, the dual positions reflected by both these 
cases are emblematic of the still confused and inconclusive understanding about the role 
of the corporation in America. Through an analysis of tax law, we can better delineate the 
corporations’ place in American society. 
 
The corporation occupies an ambiguous legal space within American society and 
law. In America, the first corporations made their appearance in the 1730s as state-
sponsored entities used as vehicles to perform public works. These entities existed based 
on the caprice of individual state legislature. In this embryonic phase of the corporations’ 
growth, the state could withdraw its charter without notice and dissolve the corporation, 
and confiscate its property holdings. It was only after the 1819 in the Trustees of 
Dartmouth College v. Woodward case that Supreme Court justices determined that 
corporations had private interests that rose above the whims of states.3 Even then, 
corporations were only allowed to hold property within the state that guaranteed their 
existence. The real transformation in the status of the corporation came as a result of the 
railway boom. Increasingly corporate entities configured themselves as joint stock, 
limited liability corporations as a means of raising capital. It was only with the liberal 
incorporation laws of New Jersey in 1889 that the modern corporation was truly born. 
Now, corporations were allowed to hold property in multiple states and with the triumph 
of Legal Realism able to behave more and more beyond their legally defined capacities, 
                                                        
3 Mickelthwait and Wooldridge, 46-50 
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almost as though they were citizens.4 The central question posed by the existence of the 
corporation relates to how it functions as a citizen and to what extent it can be governed 
by the same standards applied to other citizens of the United States. Legal historian 
Morton Horwitz argues that, “[i]n a legal system whose categories were built around 
individual activity, it was not at all easy to assimilate the behavior of groups.”5 Horwitz’s 
central contention about the development of the idea of the corporate citizen or corporate 
personality was that it arose from an inability to reconcile the American discourse of 
individual rights with the massive wave of incorporation rushing through America in the 
Gilded Age.  
 
Professor of Constitutional Law, Arthur S. Miller contends that the grounds upon 
which these individual rights are based have been eroded and transformed by the steady 
increase in a “corporate” understanding of the law. Miller calls attention to the rise of the 
“corporate state” in which all activities are organized around the understanding of 
collective behavior expressly because of the domination by corporation of the political 
economy. He argues that Constitutional law has undergone a subtle shift because the 
Supreme Court no longer decides economic legislation but its decisions have focused on 
civil rights and liberties, “in short, the position of the individual in an age of collective 
action.” Through its control of vast quantities of assets and economic behavior, and the 
                                                        
4Micklethwait and Wooldridge 67-68; Horwitz, 75-79, 170; Horwitz’s discussion of 
Legal Realism is best summarized by his claim that “Realism is a continuation of the 
Progressive attack on the attempt of late-nineteenth-century Classical Legal Thought to 
create a sharp distinction between law and politics and to portray law as neutral, natural, 
and apolitical.” The main contribution of this method of thought was a reliance on 
context to inform judicial distinctions rather than transcendent legal concepts.  
5Horwitz, 74 
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complicity of the “positive state,” supercorporations have transformed the very essence 
of law. 6 Miller’s profound ambivalence about this development stands in stark contrast to 
the triumphal optimism of historians John Micklethwait and Adrian Wooldridge who 
state that, “[t]he most important organization in the world is the company: the basis of the 
prosperity of the West and the best hope for the future of the rest of the world.”7 As a 
result of this peculiar relationship, theorists have proclaimed the death of the nation state 
because of the parasitic relationship of the corporation to it, the understanding being that 
as the state cedes more and more power to the corporation, the less effective the state is 
able to be. Yet corporations do not simply get the laws they want; rather, there is a 
greater complexity to the way that governments interact with corporations.8 
 
In truth, the development of the modern nation state was coeval with that of the 
corporation; the Portuguese, Flemish and British chartered enterprises show a clear 
lineage of the symbiotic roles played by governments and corporations. This is 
abundantly clear in the structure of the colonial enterprises of these same states. The 
close relationship between corporations and governments foreshadowed the development 
of more recent forms specifically government-driven enterprises like that of the zaibatsus 
of Japan.9 This dynamic reached its apogee in the American case and set a new standard 
by which this relationship would continue. Historian Alfred Chandler acknowledges that 
the relationship between the government and corporation has always been a complicated 
one. Of course, corporations had played a key role in a number of economies and indeed 
                                                        
6 Miller, 14, 18 
7 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, xv 
8 Lipartito and Sicilia, 20 
9 Micklethwait and Wooldridge, xvii, 18-24, 88-96 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transformed the nation state with their very existence, but Chandler states that it was the 
modern business enterprise that truly transformed America; by providing jobs, 
connectivity, cheap products, and lower transaction costs, it placed America at the center 
of the world economy. For Chandler, the modern business enterprise only came about as 
a result of the increasing reliance on mangers and structural reorganization that moved 
corporations away from the family- or partner-ownership structure. By this definition, no 
industry was more important to the development of modern America than the railroad. 
Not only did it transform the American landscape, it fundamentally altered the 
relationship between the state and the face of American modernism. The railroad 
essentially allowed managers to control the supply and production of products, 
circumventing the power of the market in determining output if not demand. 10 As a result 
of this, the government itself was transformed into a sort of manager for the corporation 
itself by “maintaining full employment and high aggregate demand” to support the 
growth of the corporation guaranteeing a market for the sale of their products.11  
 
As technology transformed the shape and distribution of demand, making the 
railroads obsolete, this governmental intervention was applied to other industries. The 
true heir to the transformative power of the railroad in America was the oil industry. No 
single resource has been imbued with more cultural, economic or strategic significance 
than oil. Perhaps the first indication of this change was in 1872 when John D. 
Rockefeller’s Standard Oil Company colluded with the Lake Shore Railroad in an 
attempt to destroy his competition by fixing favorable rates with the rail company, 
                                                        
10 Chandler, 1, 10, 90, 120 
11 Chandler, 495 
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effectively monopolizing transportation channels. Rockefeller realized the necessity of a 
well-established transportation network to guarantee the continued prosperity of his own 
enterprise, a point cemented by his integration of the Standard Steel Car Company into 
the infamous Standard Oil Trust.12 This shift reflected a new reality for America: 
railroads became important insofar as they assisted in the transportation of the new 
commodity necessary for living in the modern age – oil. 
 
The remarkable feature of the American oil industry is the notable absence of the 
government’s direct involvement. Of course, the modern national oil company is a 
comparatively recent development in the history of the industry, but American firms 
never had the governmental mandate that British and Dutch governments provided 
British Petroleum (now BP) Royal Dutch Shell. Instead the American government 
worked in a more subtle way to influence the behavior of oil firms, for instance, the ad 
hoc political arrangements between the American and British governments over the 
Perso-American Petroleum Company where the force of the State Department guaranteed 
the private interests involved in the stabilization of the North Khorestaia region of Persia 
in 1922.13 These arrangements were more than simply political. As foreign oil operations 
became more and more sophisticated, a whole new series of financial measures were put 




12 Chandler, 321, 359 
13 Hogan, 187-205 
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One of the principle financial tools used by the American government was the tax 
code. While taxes are a fiscal tool for governments to finance their existences, a favorable 
tax position is a handy financial implement for corporations. Much analysis has 
acknowledged this relationship but has stopped short of fully interrogating its 
implications. Changing the tax code necessitates a change in the relationship between the 
state and the taxpaying citizen and it is for this reason that it might be useful to 
contextualize these tax tools. One such rule – the mineral depletion allowance - is about 
as old as the Federal Income Tax; it was instituted in 1926, just thirteen years after the 
inception of the Federal Income Tax in 1913 and ostensibly recognized the fact that oil 
and gas developers relied for their incomes on a depleting asset that was risky to locate. 
Much wealth could be spent digging holes in the ground that contained no oil deposits 
whatsoever. The allowance permitted the owner of a producing oil property to deduct 
27½ percent of his gross income to minimize the size of his taxable income up to a 
limitation of fifty percent of net income before taxes. The smaller the size of taxable 
income, the smaller the incidence of federal taxes paid. The allowance itself was 
supposed to allow the developers who had taken on the uncertain business of finding and 
developing oil properties to recover the vast amounts of capital they had expended in 
locating these reserves.14  
 
As a result of the crucial role played by oil in the Second World War, a number of 
tax incentives were given to the oil industry to locate and develop a steady stream of oil 
domestically and overseas. This, in turn, led to the development of the foreign tax credit, 
                                                        
14 Senate documents give a brief history of the initial impetus for the development of the 
mineral depletion allowance; Senate Hearings, 76 
  8 
which allowed American oil companies to deduct every single cent paid in foreign taxes 
from its gross income – thus reducing its overall taxable income.15 This particular credit 
came under especial scrutiny in the case of Saudi Arabia in 1950 when the total amount 
paid in taxes to the Saudi Government was more than was paid to the American 
government.16 The mineral depletion survived intact through the tax reform of 1954, and 
was actually protected by the Kennedy administration for the same reasons as his 
revolutionary investment tax credit in 1962 – healthy industry was stimulated by the 
proper incentives, and healthy industry was what allowed America to be distinct from the 
Soviet Union.  
 
In addition to these official tax breaks, the industry attorneys developed new 
methods to extend these allowances to more industry participants. An example would be 
the use production payments to finance oil properties, which developed out of a series of 
rulings from the Supreme Court and Tax Court, dating as far back as 1932. These 
production payments became known as the ABC transaction. The ABC transaction was a 
method of property conveyance that separated the sale of an oil property into two parts, 
an operating interest and a production payment, that would be sold to two different 
parties. The transaction was designed such that both parties qualified for the depletion 
allowance. Clearly the United States “relie[d] far more heavily on the tax code as a means 
of shaping the direction of private sector investment than any other nation except 
Japan.”17 Thus any kind of change in the tax code needs to be addressed as an issue of 
                                                        
15 Yergin, 658 
16 Schulzinger, 200 
17 Vogel, 115 
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national significance. When the House bill was introduced to the Senate in the fall of 
1969 with a depletion allowance that had been cut to twenty percent from 27½ percent, 
coupled with an amendment that treated the sale of a production payment as a loan on top 
of a whole raft of other changes, it was clear that there had been a sea change in the way 
that the tax privileges of the oil industry were being treated. In the reconciliation between 
the House and Senate bills the maximum rate for statutory depletion was set at twenty-
two percent, but the treatment of production payments was transformed.  
 
The tax reform of 1969 brought all of these issues to head. Legislators clearly 
pandered to the special-interest constituents, but the fiscal crisis of the late 1960s forced 
them to reassess the position of the corporation through the manipulation of the tax code. 
The House Committee on Ways and Means must originate any bill having to do with 
revenues. The Senate finance committee must address the conclusions reached in the 
House bill before it can be passed into law. I argue that it is through a manipulation of the 
tax code and its reformulation we can understand how legislators conceptualize the 
corporation. Nowhere is this clearer than in Congress’s treatment of tax breaks in 1969. 
In particular, the mineral depletion allowance accorded to extractive industries in 
America, the chief beneficiaries of which were the oil companies, or, as President Obama 




18 Liptak, New York Times. New York Times, 21 January 2010. 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The Tax Act of 1969 was not meant to be a revolutionary document. If anything, 
the adjustment of the corpulent tax structure of the United States was a complete 
accident. Historian Allen Matusow argues that it was Richard Nixon’s horse-trading with 
House Democrats that sparked off the cause of tax reform.19 Be that as it may, the tax 
reform of 1969 yielded a number of very surprising results particularly with regard to one 
of the “the most notorious loophole[s] in all the tax code – the 27.5 percent depletion 
allowance for the oil industry”20. Indeed by the end of the reconfiguring of American tax 
laws the depletion allowance, which ostensibly encouraged domestic discovery and 
drilling of oil, had been reduced to twenty-two percent. This outcome was alternately 
viewed as a triumph against the entrenched interests of a business that had grown too 
large, over-bearing and arrogant for its own good, and as a defeat against the same 
antagonists because it had not gone far enough.  
 
If one wanted to think of the tax reform of 1969 in martial terms, as some 
historians most certainly do, then the real casualty of the process was the ABC 
transaction, outlawed by the 1969 act. Few debates display as clearly the importance that 
the tax code plays in determining the rightful role of the corporation in America. The tax 
code clearly indicates the rights, responsibilities and place of citizens, and is more than a 
fiscal tool by which the government secures its continued existence.  
 
A clear example of this is evident in the case of the railroads in West Virginia in 
the 1880s. Furor erupted over railroad companies that had not paid “their fair share of 
                                                        
19 Matusow, 41, 42 
20 Matusow, 48 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taxes.” These companies had negotiated incorporation contracts that kept them from 
paying taxes as long as their net incomes were less than the amount they had invested in 
capital for the year. As long as they kept their self-assessed levels of capital invested 
above their net incomes, they did not pay any state taxes. They had managed to do this 
despite specific references in the state constitution that barred the legislature from 
granting exemption of these payments to railroad companies.21 However, even after the 
Supreme Court had acknowledged the illegality of these actions, these same companies 
continued to avoid paying taxes, aided by a legislature that was far friendlier to the 
railroad barons than the law. Of course, this analysis assumes that the legislature and 
industrialists were discreet entities, when in fact industrialists moved between private and 
public capacities fairly frequently. The crux of the opposition to the favorable treatment 
of the railroad companies articulated by the West Virginia Tax Commission’s report of 
1884, was that state taxation policies be borne equally by all parties in the state. 
Corporations exercised privileged tax positions even though they were not domiciled 
within West Virginia and could easily relocate once the environment had been denuded 
of resources. Citizens felt that the government had a responsibility to them, enacted 
through the tax code, that involved both them and the railways rather than the 
advancement of the rail companies at the expense of farmers and miners employed by 
these companies.  
 
The taxable status of the oil corporation is clearly part of a larger historical debate 




the appropriate rights and responsibilities of a corporate individual are seems never to 
have been adequately answered. The 1969 tax reform gives us some insight into the ways 
in which legislators and oil corporations themselves have sought to answer this question. 
 
The historical debate over the place of taxation revolves around the work of two 
camps that I term the social and the political-economic. Within the social school of 
taxation, tax policy is the battleground for competing social interests. This school argues 
that the state ought to intervene in matters of taxation for the social good. Indeed if it did 
not then the formation of tax policy would rely on the competition between different 
groups in society for concessions from the state. The Progressive historian Sidney Ratner 
is a major exponent of this school. He wrote during the onset and development of the 
Cold War, and saw taxes as a necessity for the continued strength of the United States 
against the onslaught of Soviet-style communism. A healthy taxation system defended 
the moral virtue of the Unites States, a moral virtue that was premised on the idea of an 
equal society. The taxation system could not be healthy as long as “the desire for 
individual profit outweighed concern for social welfare on the part of the powerful 
business classes.”22 It was a moral imperative for the United States legislature to strive 
towards a taxation system that was “fair”. For Ratner, what was “fair” was any act that 
promoted the “social good,” a rarefied concept that he does not define beyond the 
observing that American society should embrace equality. 
 
                                                        
22 Ratner, 9, 250 
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Ratner placed taxation within a moral realm that stood in stark contrast to the 
detached analysis of the political-economic school espoused by historians and political 
economists who tend to think of tax policy “as a macroeconomic tool through which 
expert officials could stimulate national economic growth or restrain excessive 
expansion.”23 Within the framework of this school the roles of citizen and state are 
clearly delineated and taxes are simply a neutral tool by which the modern bureaucratic 
state organizes and is organized. This school focuses on the exigencies of running the 
state while ignoring the social dimension of the policies it pursues. Political scientist John 
Witte epitomizes the political-economic outlook. He argues that if the goal of tax policy 
is economic management then it ought to be insulated from political processes because 
“no one controls tax policy and that the tendency is for politicians to confer as many 
benefits on as many groups as is politically feasible.”24 
 
Witte supports a politically neutral tax policy rather than the clash of partisan 
objectives. For him, the existing method of creating tax laws logically leads to partisan 
infighting. For instance, the House Committee on Ways and Means – the principle body 
for initiating any kind of tax program – was, after 1911, the Democratic Committee on 
Committees and thus made all committee appointments for members of the Democratic 
Party. Historian Julian Zelizer points out that House speaker Sam Rayburn (D-TX) and 
Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee Robert Doughton (D-NC) “allowed only 
Democrats who supported the oil tax break to be placed on Ways and Means. Mills was 
no exception to that rule, and understood the need to protect the oil industry from any 
                                                        
23 Zelizer, 15 
24 Witte, 21, 22 
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drastic change in the tax code.”25 These actions of the Democratic Party beg the question: 
from what is the oil tax break being protected? Republicans? Public interest lobby 
groups? Zelizer and Witte both point to the fighting between different groups as being 
foundational to the formation of tax policy. Witte, somewhat more idealistically than 
Zelizer, claims that there ought to be a way that the tax system should function for some 
kind of perceived social good and in this sense flirts with but never directly engages 
Ratner’s realm of the social school.  
 
Perhaps the biggest failing of the political-economic school is that it takes for 
granted that taxes can be used simply as a tool to accomplish overarching governmental 
goals without fundamentally altering basic relationships between the state and her 
citizens. These political scientists often depict taxes as a state confiscation of purchasing 
power. In doing so, they fall into the trap of neo-classical economics, by underestimating 
the meaning of monetary transactions. Neo-classicists assume that money is simply a 
medium of exchange and store of value, and not also a nexus that communicates a certain 
set of relationships, or that it relies for its use upon a network of transactors that accept it 
as legal tender.26 As per sociologist Nigel Dodd’s argument: “Trust in money’s abstract 
properties is, by extension, trust in those agencies responsible for monetary 
administration. Trust in this sense partly depends on the political legitimacy of the state 
in question.”27 Money and all monetary transactions are embedded within a discourse on 
the role of the state and the grounds upon which it enables these transactions. Taxes are 
                                                        
25 Zelizer, 36 
26 Dodd, 13, 15 
27 Dodd, 27 
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the means through which it controls this relationship. Supreme Court justices and legal 
scholars at the turn of the nineteenth century understood that taxation contained the 
power to transform these very institutions, which is why the “power of taxation presented 
the most formidable difficulties for nineteenth century jurists intent upon establishing a 
neutral state by limiting the redistributive capacities of government.”28 The payment of 
taxes, mediated through the transfer of money, is an affirmation of this trust in political 
institutions and a means of enacting citizenship. The central government could not stand 
by unmoved and unmoving in the transformation of tax relationships; it was, by default, 
deeply implicated within them. Taxes and tax reform must be interpreted in this light.  
 
Put in this context, tax breaks can only be seen as state intervention in private 
enterprise. Historian Christopher Howard draws attention to the way that tax breaks can 
be construed as “tax expenditures,” essentially even though the government does not 
spend money directly in the pursuit of achieving an outcome; foregoing income that 
could be collected from taxation is tantamount to a direct expenditure. He argues that, 
“tax incentives inevitably favor certain groups and activities, which means that 
government is selectively influencing individual and corporate behavior.”29 This 
intervention rankles, particularly in the American case, because of the conflicted status of 
the government. In his work on Wilbur Mills, Head of the House Committee on Ways 
and Means from 1957 to 1975, Julian Zelizer makes a key point about the peculiar role of 
taxes and income tax policy in America: “Mills wanted to help maintain the presence of a 
federal government that adhered to the nation’s anti-statist, individualist, and fiscal 
                                                        
28 Horwitz, 20 
29 Howard, 4 
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values.”30 Indeed in Zelizer’s view “anti-statism and a devotion to minimal taxation 
imposed limits on state-building.”31 The government of the United States is placed in a 
very odd situation: taxes are collected on the basis of the what the government is 
supposed to provide its citizens, but what it is supposed to provide is a minimally 
invasive state which relies for its upkeep on the collection of taxes. Taxation thus forms a 
strange space within the political, economic and social lives of its citizens. From a deeper 
understanding of the role of taxes we can infer properties of the relationship between the 
American State and her citizens who are construed as taxpayers.32 
 
In sum, taxes do not simply confiscate purchasing power; they communicate a 
precise set of relationships between the state and the citizen, an understanding of the 
responsibilities of each to the other. Tax legislation exists to finance a state that 
presumably exists for the benefit of everyone and strives towards a “social good” or a 
“fair” society. Although we cannot take these concepts for granted, as Ratner does, I 
believe that through an exploration of taxation legislation, we might get a better insight 
into the way that the state works out what the social good might be and for whose benefit. 
This is explicitly a relational dialectic; the state is at once working out what its own role 
might be and how to fund itself based on what it can rightfully demand of its citizens. If 
we accept that taxation codifies this process then the question of why Congress reduced 
depletion rather than eradicated it, as it did the ABC transaction, becomes one of money 
                                                        
30 Zelizer, 21-22 
31 Zelizer, 8 
32 There is an elision in the concept of taxpayer for citizen, as though they were a single 
identity. This in turn affects how we are to think about American citizens who do not 
qualify for one reason or another to pay taxes – a topic worthy of much more analysis 
than it is possible to give in this paper.  
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and morality, firmly placed at the interstices of the relationship of the state and citizen. I 
would not have the reader believe that tax reform necessarily leads to “fair” conclusions. 
What I do contend is that the discussion of what this “fairness” or “social good” is, is 
what legislators and taxpayers try to come to better terms with in any discussion of 
taxation. This study argues that if crucial reconfigurations of the roles and responsibilities 
of citizen and state actually do occur during any kind of tax reform and particularly, then 
the 1969 tax-reform certainly exemplifies this process.  
  18 
Good Corporation, Bad Corporation: Majors, Independents and Tax Reform  
 
I fail to see that there would be any breach of faith on the fact that we consider changing 
the tax structure any more than there would be if we change the corporate rate or any 
other tax. I realize you have got a great industry and I respect you and I respect your 
right to come and argue for it. But like the Senator from New Mexico I do not think it is 
any breach of faith. I do not think you have any inherent right or constitutional right for 
this tax break forever. There is nothing sacred in the 27½ percent. It could be increased 
or lowered as Congress sees fit 
 
 Senator John J. Williams (R- DE) to George Myers of Standard Oil Co. of Indiana33 
 
Senate hearings are, on the whole, dull affairs, and hearings on taxes probably 
compete with pharmaceutical sedatives in their potent soporific effect. That is, until a 
moment like the one above where Senator John Williams vehemently objected to George 
Myers’s accusation that, by changing the tax allowance, U.S. Senators were violating 
some covenant between oil corporations and the American state and implied that the 
government had somehow failed to live up to its promises to the oil industry.34 The 
allegation was clearly rooted in some understanding about the assumed relationship 
between the government and oil companies – an assumption quickly repudiated by 
Senator Williams. It is immediately obvious in this extract that in order to answer the 
question of how much a corporation can be taxed, and how much it should be taxed, and 
on what grounds this taxation can be justified, legislators needed to figure out the place of 
the corporation in American society. 
 
                                                        
33 Senate Hearings, 4412 
34 The entire vocabulary of this debate is fraught with tension. Oilmen almost all referred 
to the tax benefits received as “incentives” whereas a number of its opponents called 
them “tax breaks” or the more nefarious, “loopholes”.  
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In seeking to answer this question, it became clear to both legislators and 
corporations that the oil industry could not be treated as a monolithic bloc. All oil 
corporations justified their tax breaks on the basis of their contributions to American 
society broadly. Yet even while they initially jointly objected to the tax reform, as the 
hearings progressed, the line between majors and independents within the industry 
became increasingly clearly drawn and this determined the shape that tax reform took. I 
argue that this break became increasingly more serious because of the peculiar standard 
by which legislators determined the fairness of the tax breaks held by the oil industry. 
This standard, which sought to reduce citizens and corporations to some lowest common 
denominator such that individual tax breaks could be compared, oversimplified the roles 
played by the different types of oil corporations and necessarily led to fractures. That 
corporations and individuals did not behave in the same way was a truism that became 
increasingly clear. The remarkable outcome of this legislation was that it realized the fact 
that even oil corporations do not behave in the same way relative to one another, and in 
attempting to cast the debate about taxes in these terms legislators’ approaches became 
increasingly arbitrary and turned the debate into one about the roles of small against big 
firm and this in turn dictated the course that reform would take.   
  
The very way in which legislators conceptualized the corporation reproduced their 
inability to determine its place in American society. Legislators saw the granting of these 
tax breaks in terms that directly related to the concept of citizenship; it was, however, a 
very constrained definition of citizenship, one that could only be understood in financial 
terms. This conclusion produced its own set of problems, namely how to reconcile the 
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disparity in financial contribution between an individual and a corporate entity. In the 
preamble introducing H.R. 13270, the bill before the Senate, Senate hands stated that, 
“percentage depletion is symbolic of a preference-prone tax structure that discriminates 
against persons whose incomes are wholly or principally from fully taxable wages and 
salaries.”35 The choice of the word “discriminate” to explain the inequity of the existing 
tax system is illuminating. The implication in this scenario being that the presence of tax 
privileges that were available to oil corporations but not regular citizens was somehow a 
violation of the right of the citizen. More than this, however, this passage equated 
conceptually corporations, which earned revenue, and individuals who earned salaries; 
fair outcomes could only come about when there was equity of financial opportunity 
between these two completely different entities. This standard of fairness showed 
Congressmen and Senators attempting to understand the relationship between 
corporations and individuals through the common denominator of financial standing, 
which transformed the question of the corporation into simply one of scale; corporations 
should be thought of as extremely wealthy citizens.  
 
This financial/economic way of thinking about fairness made it possible to 
quantify the social good and reduce it to financial terms: the social good was anything 
that equalized the access to tax privileges. Within this framework, low prices were 
equated with the social good, certainly a facile conclusion, which nonetheless found its 
supporters. Congressman George Bush (R-TX) was certainly a big proponent of this 
argument, in his statements against the attack on the existing tax breaks, he pointed out 
                                                        
35 Senate Hearings, 77 
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that while attacking oil industry tax breaks might seem like a progressive step in the 
direction of tax equity, its real results would be “a form of really regressive taxation. I 
think the burden is going to fall more on the little man that has to drive to work to hold 
his job.”36 This same argument was taken up in the Senate Hearings by Robert Dunlop of 
Sun Oil Company, who argued, “The real beneficiaries of percentage depletion have been 
the American consumers, who have had an ample supply of energy at reasonable 
prices.”37 
 
Even as Bush and Dunlop accepted the ludicrous conclusion that low prices were 
the same thing as economic welfare and that somehow tax breaks to the oil industry 
promoted the rights of citizens, their testimonies point out a crucial distinction between 
the individual citizen and the oil corporation – citizens did not and do not play the 
massive roles in the real economy that corporations do. In fact, the corporation is an 
altogether different beast than a regular citizen. Actions taken out on businesses 
necessarily have far-ranging and hard to predict consequences. To equate citizens and 
corporations was clearly a departure from recognizing that citizens and corporations 
played different roles in economic and social roles in America. Dealing with the tax 
privileges of the corporations was always going to be a balancing act that would require 
legislators to decide where the corporation stood vis-à-vis other American citizens 




36 Congressional Hearings, 1969, 3311 
37 Senate Hearings, 4401 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In fact, it was because of this confusion over the role of the corporation that it 
became possible for the advocates of the oil companies to paint all of their actions as 
performing their duty to the government of the United States. Nowhere is this clearer 
than in the case of defense. The theme of the oil company providing a bulwark against 
foreign aggression through ensuring defense was a pervasive one in nearly all the 
speeches of the oil companies. The president of Sun Oil Company argued that, “We have 
met the current needs of this Nation, and have also helped meet the emergency needs of 
friendly nations on three occasions since World War II when their supplies of petroleum 
were interrupted.”38 Every person at the hearings was aware of the role of oil in defense 
during World War II when the fates of many battles had been decided by fuel security. 
Intense German U-Boat activity in the Atlantic had provoked the construction of the 
major pipelines, Big Inch and Little Inch, that linked the Southern American oil states 
with the East Coast so that oil could be transported overland instead of running the risk of 
disruption by German forces; oil was one of the major commodities included in the Lend-
Lease arrangement with the British who were perpetually short of oil supplies. In order to 
secure the oil companies’ participation in these schemes, significant amounts of political 
maneuvering had guaranteed an increase in the price of oil through programs such as the 
PAW. Additionally, it was a well-established fact that the German campaign in North 
Africa under General Edwin Rommel had been stymied by the lack of access to oil.39 
This was a theme that even the independent producers reiterated. “National security, 
economic progress and the interests of U.S. consumers would be served best by rejecting 
                                                        
38 Senate Hearings, 4401 
39 Yergin, 369-378, 343 
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all proposed adverse changes in oil and gas tax provisions,” observed the president of 
True Oil Company, H.A. True Jr., true indeed. 40  
 
For a country that was still smarting from the sting of Vietnam, tensions in the 
Middle East and the ever-present threat of a combative Russia, the issue of national 
security was fundamental to understanding legislative responses to the arguments. Oil 
had played a decisive role in all major conflicts of the U.S. up to that point. The backbone 
of U.S. fuel security during the war had been premised on heavily encouraging domestic 
supply and manipulating New Deal market controls to spur high production. Senator John 
G. Tower (R-TX) of the Senate Armed Forces committee was very clear on the point that 
“national security dictates that we have in existence petroleum resources capable of 
satisfying our needs… The only way of ensuring an adequate domestic petroleum supply 
is through a healthy domestic oil and gas industry.”41 The mineral depletion allowance 
was the “first effective incentive” to encourage the search for more oil reserves and for 
that reason ought to continue to be preferred. Senator Tower’s argument in conjunction 
with the arguments of a number of major oil firms relied on the falling reserve ratio of 
American oil. 
 
In the discussion of the role of oil supply and defense, the problems with dealing 
with the oil industry as a single unit became increasingly clear. The focus of the 
arguments about defense brought to light significant changes that had occurred to the oil 
industry since the 1940s, namely, that by 1969 America was increasingly consuming 
                                                        
40 Senate Hearings, 4510 
41 Senate Hearings, 4388 
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larger and larger amounts of foreign oil and that by 1970 it would become a net importer 
of oil. When mineral depletion was instituted in 1926, America had been the world’s 
biggest exporter. Depletion allowances were designed to encourage domestic discovery 
to guarantee America’s domination of the oil export industry. Legislators, in order to 
justify their assault on tax incentives, needed to draw a line between different types of 
corporations. They needed to decide which firms actually contributed to the security of 
the nation. This allowed for a real appreciation of the difference between the independent 
oil companies and the vertically integrated majors. If fuel security was the main 
justification for depletion, then the only companies that could claim to aid in securing 
America should have been the domestically domiciled independents.  
 
As far as Senator Proxmire (D-WI) was concerned, the depletion allowance 
exacerbated the problem of American fuel security. This was because the majors – the 
only firms with the financial resources and political contacts to be able to drill overseas – 
used the depletion allowance to minimize their taxes paid on all fronts. This made foreign 
oil cheaper relative to domestic oil and increased the allocation of capital to the majors 
and the reliance on foreign oil.42 Thus American taxpayers had been subsidizing the 
lifestyles of foreigners who happened to own a natural resource that was essential to 
American life. In fact Proxmire argued that the mineral depletion allowance and 
intangible drilling expensing had also provided domestic producers with the incentives to 
develop overseas because it was an allowance that major oil companies overseas 
                                                        
42 Senate Hearings, 4223 
  25 
frequently used to minimize the size of their taxes.43 Proxmire singled out the majors as 
targets in this tax reform because they did not actually provide the fuel security that they 
purportedly offered. That oil corporations provided this essential component of American 
life was clear, but the proceedings also clarified that the conceptual differences of oil 
corporations from regular citizens; not only that, but that within the industry itself there 
were fault lines based on the size of the oil companies in question.  
 
These distinctions of place manifested themselves in the way that oil corporations 
presented their defenses of the tax savings. Oil firms attempted to depict themselves as 
stand-ins for American society, as if by proximity to American citizens, they could be 
identified in the same way. It is no surprise that the oil companies that were able to do 
this most successfully were the independent oil firms in contrast to the majors. The 
Senators and Congressmen of domestic oil states expounded the idea of the independent 
oil company as civic unit. The independent oil companies were able to paint the looming 
tax changes as a civic disaster with immediate consequences.  
Senator Hansen (R- WY): I am told by the people of my State that perhaps 
90 percent of the independent oil activity – an activity which has brought 
the discovery of between 75 and 80 percent of all of the new reserves in 
this country, exclusive of those on the Outer Continental Shelf – that if 
these tax proposals are enacted about 90 percent of the independents will 
go out of business. What will be done to provide jobs in my State and in 
other oil-producing States for those who will be unemployed because such 
a significant portion of the oil industry will be out of business? 
  
Secretary Kennedy: That is a very leading question, Senator, because I do 
not believe that 90 percent of them will go out of business44  
 
                                                        
43 Senate Hearings, 4211 
44 Senate Hearings, 543 
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The changes in tax breaks were understood by the independents as an arrow pointed 
directly at the heart of the domestic oil industry. A change in depletion and 
reclassification of the production payment seemed specifically targeted at the domestic 
oil industry. The domestic oil firms were much smaller than the major firms. They had 
far more limited financial resources at their disposal than, say, Standard Oil of New 
Jersey. It was to them that the highly risky business of locating oil fell, for “when 
independents weren’t drilling, U.S. reserves began to decline.”45 The real victims in the 
case of eliminating percentage depletion, were not the majors but in fact the downtrodden 
independents. It appears as though independents were aware of this victimized position. 
In a documents submitted by True Oil Company, an analyst writes, “the impact of all the 
proposed tax changes on the independent producer’s funds and incentives would be far 
greater than the estimated twenty percent reduction for far larger companies. We estimate 
in aggregate, a forty percent reduction in expenditures for exploration and development 
activities by individual independent producers in the twelve to twenty-four months 
following adoption of the proposed tax changes.”46 The division in the interests between 
the majors and independents was clearly drawn because of their conceptual distance from 
American society. 
 
The statements of Myron Wright confirmed this distance. As the Chairman of 
Humble Oil and Refining Company47, he supported the status quo because of the great 
advantages conveyed by the oil industry – “petroleum has brought us from the horse-and-
                                                        
45 Goodwyn, 127 
46 Senate Hearings, 4487 
47 Humble Oil was majority-owned by Standard Oil of New Jersey and eventually 
merged with SONJ to form Exxon 
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buggy days to an age of jets and spaceships.”48 The entire progress of the American 
nation was thrown into further relief in Bob Dorsey’s testimony about the legislative 
history of America. Dorsey lionized the year 1926, the year of the depletion allowance’s 
inception, and also “the year that Henry Ford’s ‘Tin Lizzie’ really reached a peak. The 
‘Model T’ was the people’s automobile.” He thus equated the cause of America with the 
progress of the oil industry. Indeed Dorsey’s entire testimony was designed to locate the 
cause for American modernity in the petroleum industry. Oil “made possible a whole new 
set of freedoms permitting our population to move about easily, increasing everyone’s 
opportunities for education and jobs, expanding their choices of a place to live, and 
providing new and wonderful recreational possibilities.”49 The main rhetorical flourish 
taken up in these arguments was essentially to demonstrate that the continuity of the very 
American way of life was dependent on a continuation of the current tax policies. In a 
sense, these companies saw themselves as providing a social benefit just by going about 
their business, their very existence guaranteeing a certain way of life to which Americans 
had grown accustomed. They were fulfilling not just a corporate motive but enacting a 
civic duty through their operations.   
 
In contrast to the majors’ more sweeping claims about an American civilization 
and the language of technological progress, the independents focused on the fact that they 
were so deeply embedded in their societies that any challenge to tax structures would 
necessarily have adverse effects on society because of that relationship. Texas, home to 
the richest known oil resources in the United States up to that point, had a vested interest 
                                                        
48 Congressional Hearings, 1969, 3165 
49 Congressional Hearings, 1969, 3176 
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in any kind of legislation that would affect the oil industry. A number of independent 
producers’ associations were located in Texas. It was the president of one of these 
institutions – Donald Watson of the Panhandle Producers and Royalty Owners 
Association who claimed that, “In our area the petroleum industry contributes a large 
share of funds to support educational and other services of State and local governments… 
Any reduction or loss of the ‘mineral depletion’ provision would create a serious 
financial crisis for our school as well as our State and local governmental agencies.”50 By 
identifying the interests of the oil companies with their societies, Watson built on the 
“social capital” of the independent to push forward his argument.51 
 
The debate over depletion was more than one of financial incentives or financial 
equality, for lawmakers it became one about the very existence of the American state and 
the roles of oil corporations in guaranteeing its continued existence. If the declamations 
of the various firms proved anything, it was that oil companies were qualitatively 
different from regular citizens and had to be treated as such. Even as Congress attempted 
to quantify the contribution of the oil companies, they increasingly came up against the 
limits what this quantifying would achieve. The concept of what was “fair” eluded the 
characterization of the social good as simply low prices. While it is clear that the oil 
companies conceived of their contributions to American society in financial terms, their 
ideas of what their contributions to fellow Americans ought to be and what their 
opponents thought were very much at odds. The way to deal with these companies had to 
be determined by a more expansive meaning of justice and fairness than simply 
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equalizing financial opportunity or access to tax breaks. The counterpoint to the 
American oil companies and their political supporters were senators such as the acerbic 
William Proxmire (D-WI) who pointed out that the stakes of tax breaks were much 
higher than the oil companies were willing to accept. These lawmakers took a much more 
expansive view of the tax breaks the oil companies, in that their viewpoints were 
bolstered by the bleak economic outlook of the late 1960s.  
 
The American economy in the 1969 was in the heat of an inflationary spell put 
down to the massive increase in governmental expenditure in response to the Vietnam 
War and President Johnson’s war on poverty.52 In his address to Congress on 3rd August 
1967, President Lyndon Johnson had warned Congressmen of the looming deficit and the 
need for it to be dealt with by a combination of borrowing and taxation. Johnson’s 
suggestion of a surtax on individuals and corporations were what had sparked the Nixon 
tax reform in the first place.53 In 1967, there had been a number of objections to 
Johnson’s proposal because it did not suggest an equitable way to close the budget 
deficit. The surtax was regressive and placed the costs of macroeconomic stability on 
American citizens. The most vocal critic of the surtax Congressman Herbert Tenzer (D-
NY) who suggested that massive deficit should be dealt with through cutting back on tax 
loopholes extended to various different industries – particularly the oil industry.54 
However the issue before Congress in 1967 was not a reform of the tax code, but merely 
to decide whether to push through Johnson’s surtax in the fiscal year 1968, these 
                                                        
52 Matusow, 13 
53 The surtax was a tax on the amount that people would pay in taxes, not income. Thus, a 
10 percent surtax on an tax amount of $1000 would simply be $100.  
54 Congressional Hearings, 1967, 288 
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criticisms never managed to be taken seriously.  By 1969, however, because the surtax 
had proved to be ineffective in raising sufficient revenue, taxes and tax breaks had to be 
discussed in terms of how they would fan these inflationary fires.55 Unlike defense, 
economic primacy was a governmental problem that could not be left to the vagaries of 
private contractors. The first people to admit that the current tax treatment inflated oil 
property prices were, oddly enough, the oil producers themselves. In arguing for the 
retention of the legality of the ABC transaction, Netum Steed of the Texas Independent 
Producers and Royalty Owners Association (TIPRO) claimed that sellers of oil properties 
were able to “get a much better price because of the ABC provision.”56  
 
The debate over the role of taxes exposed the blatantly different standards to 
which oil companies needed to be held. If oil firms received such largesse from the 
government, then surely they had to pay for it. In a typically biting commentary Proxmire 
overrode the defense argument of the major oil companies. Emilio Collado – Executive 
Vice President of SONJ – submitted a list of countries and the respective tax breaks that 
they gave to oil companies to encourage oil development as a means of proving that 
American companies would be handicapped if their tax treatment were to be altered57. 
Although not responding directly to this document, Proxmire clearly pointed to the 
paradox of the situation, “If I were of an ironical frame of mind, I would say that these 
bastions of free enterprise – the major oil companies – were actually encouraging 
                                                        
55 Senate Hearings, 4225 
56 Congressional Hearings, 1969, 3295 
57 Senate Hearings, 4451-4454 
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socialism.”58 This is a theme that Vogel also elaborates on when he suggests that 
“American businessmen, throughout most of their history and particularly over the last 
forty years have proven incapable of understanding adequately the economic and political 
requirements of the socioeconomic system upon whose political stability and economic 
growth their own social existence rests.”59 Proxmire, beyond his disavowal of the tax 
breaks in front of the Senate, never actually articulated in positive terms the basis for his 
characterization of the relationship between firms and the government as socialist. 
Beyond gesticulating about the unfairness of the tax break, he never delineated what the 
relationship ought to be. In fact, the debate about the tax breaks seems to have been 
limited by this very oversight. 
 
It seems that as confused as corporations were about their status, lawmakers were 
equally unsure of where they stood on the issue. While American oil firms were very 
expressive and imaginative in explaining their position in society, they refused to 
understand that this position relied on a specific set of governmental policies that 
privileged their industry. Proxmire pointed out that as much as American companies were 
a part of their societies, the American government was actively involved, at a granular 
level, in the way that these same companies made their profits. In fact, the American 
government was involved in a more direct way with these synthetic entities than with 
citizens directly. Thus, in the reconfiguration that Proxmire and his colleagues urged, 
they directed the legislature to renegotiate the existing relationship through a 
transformation of the tax code.  
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Perhaps the independents’ grudging change in attitude toward tax reform reflected 
an appreciation of these complex power dynamics. This marks a departure from the 
monolithic characterization of the oil industry. In a letter to the Senate dated October 6, 
1969, the president of the Kansas Independent Oil and Gas Association (KIOGA) 
admitted that the H.R. 13270 contained “reasonal [sic] provisions for the small domestic 
independent operator.” The letter was signed by Tom Schwinn, the vice-president of the 
organization who, just the preceding week had claimed that while he was in sympathy 
with the government in trying to close tax loopholes, argued that, “the methods proposed 
in both the House bill and by the Treasury to correct this situation, do not justify the 
drastic changes and penalties imposed upon the majority of legitimate oil and gas 
operators who are now paying a fair share of the necessary burden of the cost of 
government.”60 This contrasted directly with the statement that Schwinn submitted on 
behalf of KIOGA: “We recognize the imperative necessity for tax reform. The oil 
industry must bear a portion of the cost of this reform. The Proxmire amendment 
provides tax reform.” 61 Schwinn’s reversal of opinion seems oddly enthusiastic given his 
previous disavowal of change. I believe that the main reason given for this new support 
for the bill was due to the promise guaranteed by the Proxmire amendment that would 
attack the tax breaks given to the majors in addition to those taken away from the 
independents. The majors never managed to convey their support for the bill. That said, 
the elimination of the foreign tax credit that the domestically based independents sought 
did not actually materialize as a result of the 1969 reform; in fact, neither did the 
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elimination of foreign depletion. These were not to happen until the amendments made to 
the tax act in 1975.  
 
Fairness underlay the arguments over the right of the government to change tax 
laws. In attempting to put all the taxpayers in the American economy on an equal playing 
field, legislators sought to understand the tax breaks enjoyed by corporations as if the 
corporations themselves were citizens; and thus divine a concept of fairness or equality 
from this analogy. As we have seen, this system of thought was stymied by the very fact 
that corporations played a different role in America than regular citizens. As a result of 
this focus on analyzing tax breaks as they related to function, a method of thought that 
rhetorically favored the independents, the language employed against the majors was 
harsh and incredibly critical. Legislators had clearly decided that eventhough the majors 
provided a massive service to the American nation, they could not with clean consciences 
permit the kinds of tax breaks that they had been receiving. Yet the way in which 
legislators came to the question of fairness needs analysis.  
 
In attempting to deal with the problem posed by the corporation, given all of its 
economic and social functions, opponents of depletion sought to create a fair and just 
system by pruning tax breaks and loopholes. Congressmen and Senators definitely saw 
justice as being a force that could work through the tax code, but what was the basis of 
this fairness? These issues reinforce Horwitz’s claim about the nature of the collective 
entity: there had not been any concrete way in which to cope with the corporation and 
determine its legal basis or place and therefore the basis upon which decisions about 
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fairness were made was not based on some mathematically derived notion of cost. Rather 
the issues being debated within both Senate and Congress relied on a referendum on what 
a fair tax contribution by a corporation could and should be. As we can see there were 
clearly different standards that could be expected of the different players within the oil 
industry. The next section of this essay will look into the concepts of fairness by 
analyzing in a more detailed way the precise tax devices that the House sought to alter.  
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Taxation in Action: Enacting Citizenship 
 
Let’s face it – our tax laws as presently constituted soak the last penny from the ordinary 
citizens while allowing a privileged few, through devices such as the oil depletion 
allowance, to escape contributing their fair share to our national burden 
 
Congressman Joseph Minish (D-NJ)62 
 
 
In his speech to the Congress, Representative Joseph Minish, an active labor 
organizer and Democratic loyalist appealed to his colleagues’ sense of justice to argue 
against the mineral depletion allowance. He called attention to the fact that oil companies 
had access to tax allowances that “ordinary citizens” did not, and that the way the tax 
break was structured ended up redistributing income from individuals to corporations and 
for that reason the “circumstances which originally caused the conferring of special 
incentives upon the oil industry in 1926 no longer prevail[ed].”63 Minish added his voice 
to those of other reformers to make the claim that the existing tax code was an 
impediment to some kind of “fair” society, and that this was the case because of the very 
existence of tax shelters. Minish stands out as a voice of this period because he was one 
of very few legislators that wanted to completely eliminate depletion; that is for both 
majors and independents. His declamations relied on typical themes that all opponents of 
the tax break system relied upon: fairness and function. These two concepts were 
intimately related for the opponents of entrenched oil privileges, but how did these 
thinkers conceptualize fairness and why did they think that the oil corporations should be 
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bound by its constraints? How did they think they were able to secure this through the tax 
code?  
 
These questions can be answered by a close analysis of how these tax shelters 
worked. The percentage depletion allowance was fairly straightforward. The taxpayer 
would basically calculate his or her net income based on the revenues and costs for the 
fiscal year. From this amount, he would be able to deduct further amounts based on the 
number of tax breaks or deductions for which it qualified. In the case of the percentage 
depletion, assuming no other deductions – the taxpayer would subtract 27½ percent of 
that amount to arrive at his or her taxable income.  The ABC transaction was a means of 
conveying property between three transactors: A, B and C. This method guaranteed the 
depletion allowance for two out of the three participants in the transaction. It was not so 
much the splitting of the right to depletion that riled opponents but that this transaction 
allowed participants to manufacture losses to limit the size of their taxable incomes, often 
in excess of the fifty percent limitation that governed the 27½ percent depletion.64  
 
To counter depletion, legislators merely wished to minimize the size of the 
allowance; as for the ABC transaction, they wanted to abolish it completely by 
transforming the process into one akin to a mortgage. In attempting to deal with the ABC 
transaction, legislators became aware of a new power granted to them through an 
omission of the Supreme Court. It was this recognition that enabled them to re-categorize 
the ABC transaction as a debtor-creditor relationship and then go on to craft a vision of 
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mechanics of the ABC transaction.  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fairness much more in line with Ratner’s beliefs about society than what the Supreme 
Court had been able to guarantee. It was this extra-legal conception of fairness that 
allowed them to properly combat the depletion allowance, despite constraints from 
outside of the political realm of tax codification.  
 
Often, the first mistake in thinking about the ABC transaction is to think of it as 
the conveyance of a typical kind of property. However the ABC transaction was 
remarkable because it was a uniquely corporate way of holding property. This was based 
on a series of Supreme Court decisions from the 1930s.65 These decisions conferred 
depletion to transactors B and C on the basis of the fact that they owned an “economic 
interest” in the oil property; that is, they both stood the chance to derive income from the 
exploitation of the lease. Thus B and C co-owned the oil lease and should be allowed the 
depletion. In doing so, legal scholar J. Reid Hambrick argued that the Supreme Court had 
essentially created a space where property rights were relegated to a “strictly secondary 
position” in deference to treating a mineral deposit like an “economic opportunity” that 
relied on the sharing of burden of discovery between lessor and lessee.66 It must be made 
clear that this legal relationship did not rely for its force on the ownership of property; 
rather, it was the contractual obligation between parties, cooperating to exploit oil land 
that defined whether the taxpayer was able to qualify for statutory depletion. The 
production payment thus exhibited a new type of property relationship between economic 
actors.  
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When opponents of the transaction sought to re-codify the relationship between B 
and C as being one of debtor-creditor rather than co-owner, they sought to reverse a 
drastic shift in constitutional thought on the concept of property. Horwitz explains that in 
the period between the end of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries the 
Supreme Court was increasingly dealing with the dilemma of private property as 
“physicalist conceptions of property based on land ownership” moved to more abstract 
notions, which in turn laid the grounds under which “the very conception of property 
became infinitely expandable.”67 The production payment was the logical conclusion of 
the anti-physicalist conception of property. This was aided by a further development in 
Constitutional law: Miller argued that the “‘liberty’ protected by due process of law 
became the freedom to contract.” Corporate thinking had transformed the basic concept 
of liberty from the idea of negative freedoms to that of positive rights. 68 Corporations 
could do as they pleased with the law because they had become empowered to do so. 
This was a fact brought increasingly to bear on the oil industry as more and more 
participants utilized the ABC transaction to purchase oil properties.  
 
This new conception of property, however, did not sit well with opponents of the 
tax breaks because they rendered tax relationship incomprehensible. The joint ownership 
doctrine made it possible to propagate tax savings to a wide variety of individuals. This is 
what caused tax analyst Paul Haber to argue that the “real villains” in the tax system were 
not tools such as the depletion allowance but rather the devices that allowed for the 
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translation of these tax benefits to other actors, such as the members of high-income 
brackets who somehow managed to buy into the benefits of the depletion allowance.69 
The creative corporate claim to co-ownership of property allowed the depletion 
allowance to be used in a variety of highly innovative instruments, which a variety of 
organizations and wealthy individuals could use to shrink the sizes of their taxable 
incomes. The artificial losses created by the transaction were well known; Nixon singled 
them out for reform in his speech to Congress, and mutual funds purchased them to 
minimize the paper size of their profits and tax strategists commonly demonstrated how 
to maximize the savings that could be gleaned from them.70 Thus Congressmen and 
Senators criticized the production payments for being a means by which owners of such 
products could “circumvent the fifty percent limitation that can be taken under the statute, 
for percentage depletion.”71 
 
Oilmen were highly sensitive to the change that legislators wished to make. 
Wallace Wilson, Vice President of Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust 
Company, one of many voices in the oil industry faction, depicted the oil industry as 
victim of the “inconsistent opportunism” of a fickle government. He argued, essentially, 
that the government had no right to demonize the oil industry when it found that it was 
short of funds due to its own fiscal mismanagement, especially since the transaction was 
fully legal and protected under the aegis of the Supreme Court. By asserting that the 
production payment was supposed to be a transfer of ownership of property, the Treasury 
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sought to overturn the treatment of property rights and relationships that had come to 
define the oil industry almost from its advent to the moment of reform in 1969. Oilmen 
were very much aware of the stakes of this attack. Wallace Wilson, so vehemently 
objected to them that he argued that the production payment “create[d] only a property 
right, and not a debtor-creditor relationship,” thus asserting a contemporary notion of 
property as it related to the oil and gas industry. For the government to overturn this 
arrangement would be wholly destabilizing and place the blame for the use of the 
transaction on the oil industry when in fact it was governmental regulations that had 
created the current state of affairs. 72 
  
Yet the irony of the situation was that because of the devolvement of economic 
decision-making to Congress, legislators were not bound by the same limitations as 
justices of the Supreme Court – the Constitution. Harold Rogers, the attorney who 
represented the North Texas Oil and Gas Association, wrote, “It may be worthy of note 
that while the proposed treatment of production payments was vigorously opposed by 
some witnesses at the Tax Reform Hearings, its constitutionality was apparently not 
questioned.” Rogers’s criticism of this approach to tax reform was that it allowed 
legislators to ignore the concept of due process as secured by the Fifth Amendment.73 
This is most certainly true. Rogers tacitly asserted that it was the role of the Supreme 
Court to adjudicate in matters of property. However, Rogers had not fully appreciated the 
shift within the Supreme Court that had been occurring from the late 1950s through the 
1960s. Miller’s argument over the changing nature of the questions to which the Supreme 
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Court applied itself necessitated Congress’s intervention in matters of property. 74 For this 
very reason, the place of the tax code as means of communicating economic and property 
relationships to its constituents became increasingly important. Congress was not bound 
by the same necessity of interpreting property rights in light of the Constitution. It had 
much more room to improvise. Which is why it was able to combat the existing 27½ 
percent depletion. 
 
Clearly, the debate over the status of the ABC transaction, while being one about 
how much tax a person ought to pay, was as much about who and why a person should 
pay their taxes, and on what grounds the government could even demand their payment. 
As a result this debate was one that went to the heart of the American state – the status of 
private property and the state’s responsibility in guarding its integrity. The unique 
property ownership situation created by the ABC transaction could not be countered on 
legal grounds and did not really even need to be. Thus its adversaries crafted a critique of 
the arrangement on a conception of justice that existed outside of the legal realm. In order 
to do this convincingly, this assortment of politicians, academics and tax lawyers and 
accountants tended to analyze the role that these tax tools played in society. They sought 
to alter the tax code to better reflect a “fairer” vision of society. As per Minish’s 
statements, these reformers argued that the exigencies of a fair society were more 
important than the supposed benefits rendered by the oil corporations.  
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Senator Proxmire argued for view of the corporation as a social actor, thus 
subjecting depletion to a higher standard than accounting efficacy. In doing so, he 
substituted the financial equivalency of supporters of the status quo and challenged it 
with a broader view of the role of the corporation. Proxmire’s general approach to 
justifying his assault on mineral depletion was embodied in his sharp invective against 
the oil industry:  
Any tax system which requires 22 million people under the poverty level 
to pay Federal income taxes, yet allows Atlantic Richfield to earn over 
$465million between 1964 and 1967 without paying 1 red cent in Federal 
income taxes clearly requires revision75 
 
That corporations managed to evade paying a proper amount of taxes was harmful to 
American citizens. He articulated a vision of fairness that rose above the proper 
adjudication of property interests but was grounded in deeper questions of what could be 
considered just. Proxmire, and his supporters, advocated the involvement of the 
government in protecting citizens from iniquities that had no relation to property. The oil 
companies’ privilege was funded through a regressive redistributive process.  As far as 
they were concerned, it was to be the responsibility of the government to correct this 
massive oversight despite having granted it in the first place. 
 
The intellectual powerhouse of progressive taxation – Stanley Surrey – sought to 
place the oil taxes in the context of a framework larger than simply accounting fairly for 
eroding assets. As part of a thought experiment he suggested thinking about tax 
incentives as if they were programs that the government directly subsidized or to think of 
tax expenditures as direct expenditures. The conclusion he reached was that tax 
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incentives appeared “highly irrational when phrased as direct expenditure programs.”76 
By likening the tax expenditures to a subsidy program Surrey identified the extent to 
which governmental forces were involved in the inner workings of the oil industry. An 
essay from 1966 argued that, “since the present scheme of depletion was designed to 
compensate for the risk involved in exploration and to furnish an incentive for initial 
investments, the reward of percentage depletion should only be given to those who are 
actually responsible for the development of the property.”77 The functionalist view was 
not new to thinking on taxes. In his article decrying the blatant pandering to special 
interests in the Tax Reform of 1954, Michael Cary argued that the independent oil 
producer should have access to depletion only because of the risk that he took on in 
drilling potentially dry holes.78 B should be allowed the depletion deduction because he 
carried most of the risk for the development of risky oil properties. Since C did not 
shoulder any of the risk in the discovery of oil, he did not deserve to be compensated 
through the mechanism of the tax incentive. 
 
If tax incentives were tied to function, then it became very hard to defend the 27½ 
percent depletion on any grounds other than financial – and even then this was a tough 
sell. It would seem that the reduction of the mineral depletion would be an attack on the 
oil industry in toto, but this change would affect the major oil producers most acutely. 
Mineral depletion only worked at the full 27½ percent rate if the amount that was being 
deducted from gross income was less than fifty percent of net income before the tax 
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deduction. Thus for a firm to deduct the full amount, their net incomes had to be of 
substantial amounts. One of the biggest complaints about depletion from the independent 
oil operators was that they were not able to take full advantage of the statutory rates.79 
Indeed a number of them urged an increase in the net limitation during this reform about 
reducing tax incentives, and in the particular case of the President of the Oklahoma 
Independent Producers Association, a complete abolition.80 Independent operators did not 
have the wide enough capital bases to take advantage fully of depreciation. For this 
reason, any attack on depletion affected the majors much more than it was the 
independents.  
 
In case there was any ambiguity Congressman Minish pointed out that, “two-
thirds of the depletion allowances are claimed by companies with assets of over a quarter 
of a billion dollars.”81 This was clearly not a reference to the small producers who sold 
oil at wellhead costs to distributors, but to the major integrated companies that could not 
only dig up oil but also market it cheaply, relative to the domestic, often independent oil 
producers. Which is why Proxmire’s allegation, based on the industrially despised 
CONSAD report, that the depletion allowance resulted in “deductions about 19 times in 
excess of actual costs,” was so chillingly disturbing.82 The majors’ strident objections to 
ending depletion suddenly made more sense.  
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The reason that the majors accounted for so much legislative ire was that they 
received huge breaks in their overseas operations through domestic tax breaks. Assistant 
Secretary Cohen informed, “the special problem connected with foreign mineral income 
which can and should be dealt with arises from the lower effective U.S. rate on mineral 
production resulting from our percentage depletion incentive.”83  Cohen specifically 
referred to the foreign tax credit received by the majors, which provided an exemption on 
taxes paid overseas from being included in the taxable base of a corporation, used in 
combination with percentage depletion. The majors were able to qualify for both of these 
exemptions that made foreign oil even cheaper than domestically-sources oil. The 
presence of both neutralized the fuel security that was supposed to be provided by a 
healthy domestic industry. Not only this, but they exacerbated the problem of resource 
allocation to foreign countries, guaranteeing the retrogression of the domestic oil 
industry. Any repeal on depletion motivated by American decisions would automatically 
affect the profits of oil companies overseas and would need to be paired with an attack on 
the foreign income tax credit. There really could be no point this combination of tax 
breaks beyond Emilio Collado’s obviously specious argument that it somehow aided 
national security by allowing American corporations to be internationally competitive.84  
 
If the point of standard depletion was to compensate for mechanical degradation, 
which occurred over a finite period, then what was the government subsidizing when it 
permitted large oil properties that might produce oil for many years? In likening the tax 
breaks received by corporations, opponents of oil tax breaks definitely fell victim to the 
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trap of corporate citizenship that the proponents did. However the effects of this were 
somewhat mitigated by their focus on the function that these tax breaks played in society. 
It was from this focus that they were able to articulate a vision of tax equity. When 
politicians such as Minish and Proxmire brought up the idea of fairness, they challenged 
the view that corporations were beneficial to America simply because they enriched 
her.85 They argued that the government was too closely identified with the cause of the 
corporation to the abstraction of its real duties – fairness to regular citizens. The attack on 
the depletion allowance was thus an assault on this close-knit relationship between the 
state and the corporation on the grounds that the state was too involved in the financial 
standing of the corporation. The assertion made by proponents of the tax reform of the oil 
industry was that it was not the government’s place to be so deeply embedded within the 
social standing of the oil industry, especially if it subsidized the majors.  
 
This is not to say that the reform was an unqualified success nor that the analytic 
strength of the idea of equity carried the day. After Minish, there were no voices of any 
significance that urged the complete eradication of the depletion allowance. Indeed the 
vacillation between lowering and raising the depletion allowance clarifies this 
unfortunate dynamic further. While it was clear that the House sought to establish the 
place of the corporation through manipulation of the tax code, what was not clear, 
however, was why Congress thought that a 7½ percent cut was fair, and if that was fair 
then why they accepted an upward revision to twenty-two percent when the bill was 
finally passed into law after being amended by the Senate. The conclusion we must draw 
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from this is that the ultimate point of settlement at twenty-two percent was not calculated 
according to a precise estimation of the exact monetary/social contribution to American 
society. Instead it reflected the political trading between opponents and proponents in the 
same way that the original 27½ percent had been computed. Legal analyst Paul Dodyk 
clearly stated his disappointment: “due to the limitations imposed upon the Treasury's 
reformist aspirations by the maelstrom of political force encountered. The reduction of oil 
and gas depletion by 5½ % and of the depletion of other minerals by 1% or nothing, 
when faithful homage to the comprehensive tax base would have indicated the abolition 
of percentage depletion altogether, is symptomatic of this dimension of the Reform Act's 
limitations.” 86 Rather than the quantity of the deduction, for reformers the most that 
could be done to constrain tax breaks was a minute reduction. 
 
To be clear, the government was, and is, deeply embedded within the operations 
of corporations as is made clear in the case of the oil industry. Despite cries about 
excessive intervention in the private sector by oil corporations themselves, the 
government had/ has always played a role in the continued success (read, skyrocketing 
profits) of the oil industry. Once H.R. 13270 passed through Congress and went up to the 
Senate, Senate Finance Committee Chairman, Russell Long  (D-LA) felt the need to 
clarify with Secretary of the Treasury David Kennedy that H.R. 13270 was not, in fact, 
“anything other than an extremely anti-oil bill.”87 It is not altogether clear that this 
anxiety was well placed.  
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Reflections on 1969 
 
Oil politics went beyond the numbers; to these legislators from the oil-producing states, it 
was almost a religious matter. Passions ran high when oil was discussed, and reason was 
cast to the wind. The assembled senators were ready to fight to kill the bill if they did not 
get their way. 
Jeffrey Birnbaum and Alan Murray on the 1986 tax reform88 
 
 
Zelizer points out that the 1969 moment was not a dramatic shift in tax legislation 
as it related to the oil industry because the “Tax Reform Act of 1969 did not attempt to 
eliminate the tax-break system, only to reform and control it. Most tax shelters were 
reduced or tightened but not eliminated, as seen in the lowering of the oil depletion 
allowance.”89 Journalists Jeffrey Birnbaum and Alan Murray support this view and see 
the 1969 reform as a tentative step in the right direction, as far as tax breaks were 
concerned, but one where reforms were transient and ultimately ineffective until the real 
moment of decisive change – 1986.90 That the very concept of the tax break itself had not 
been questioned was the most disturbing outcome of the 1969 act. Instead, despite the 
harsh economic climate, politicians, even the most strident opponents of reform, had 
decided that the tax breaks themselves could not be entirely eliminated, but merely 
constrained. To be fair, this was not actually challenged in 1986, either. 
 
It was not clear that even this tempered conclusion registered with the oil 
companies that only understood that two fairly important tax privileges had been 
eliminated. The Oil and Gas Journal discerned a clear shift in the government’s 
relationship with the oil industry when it reported that the oil industry “took [tax reform] 
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on the chin.” They blamed this fate on inexplicable about-face of Congressman Hale 
Boggs (D-LA) who had suddenly gone savage on industry breaks that he had previously 
supported. Perhaps what was so surprising to the writers of this industry newspaper was 
the fact that the oil industry had been caught so completely off-guard.91 It went on to 
report in August that Russell Long had wanted to return the depletion from 20 percent to 
27½ when the bill reached the Senate – which was patently not true. The Oil and Gas 
Journal gloomily reported that in “view of the prevailing atmosphere, however, oil-state 
congressmen and senators privately doubt this is possible. Unless reform is somehow 
blocked in the Senate, details will be solved in conference.”92 The Journal depicted the 
“prevailing atmosphere” as something totally different from previous situations.  
 
The House Ways and Means Committee, of course, was systemically predisposed 
towards not rocking the boat, as pointed out by John Manley in his sociological study of 
this most powerful of committees.93 So it was nothing short of extraordinary that these 
Congressmen had suggested a bill that attacked a previously sacrosanct tax break, a tax 
break, as noted earlier, that governed their admission to the committee in the first place. 
In addition to the commonly held assumption that the House really controlled the 
conferencing process, the proponents of the industry tax breaks had good reason to be 
scared. Perhaps even more shocking was the fact that this bill had such vociferous 
support within the Senate. Senator Proxmire’s muckraking on 1969 was reminiscent of 
his efforts during the Kennedy revenue crisis of 1962. Gilles claims that, “Prior to 1958 
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not even the required 10 senators would support a roll-call vote,” and in 1962 there had 
been an overwhelming majority vote to keep mineral depletion in place.94 Thus the much-
vaunted ability of the conservative elements of the Senate Finance Committee to protect 
the interests of businesses appeared to be less and less likely to be brought to bear.95 Still, 
the edifice of the tax break system forced itself through. 
 
This persistence paints the protestations of the oil industry in an especially 
churlish light. How could the most strident opponents of oil industry privileges think that 
a 5½ percent reduction made an actual dent in the tax savings of these firms? The simple 
solution is that they did not. Instead, in the continuation of tax privileges through the 
proliferation of loopholes, perhaps the state sought to achieve its own goals through the 
operations of the corporation. This cooperation had its roots in the end of the Second 
World War. Historian David Sicilia contends that even as the government partnered with 
the firms in the tobacco, chemical and nuclear industries, it created various regulatory 
agencies to act as oversight for these exact entities. He argues that the “new social 
regulation of the late 1960s and early 1970s was one of the nation’s great state-building 
projects.”96 The cost of this expansion was born by corporations. The relationship 
between the government and the corporation was a tug-of-war between accommodation 
and control. There is certainly evidence to support Sicilia’s claim of the changing nature 
of the government to the oil industry. It was the detailed and concerted assault on the 
majors that set the groundwork for the 1974 repeal of foreign depletion, thanks 
                                                        
94Gilles, 781, fn 14; Martin, 74 
95 Manley, 49 
96 Lipartito and Sicilia, 202 
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principally to the distinction made in the 1969 act between majors and independents – a 
distinction that was cemented in 1975.97 The 1975 repeal of all foreign depletion for the 
majors was the culmination of this campaign, aided, no doubt, by the oil crisis of 1973. 
 
 However, it would be wrong to categorize the evolving relationship between the 
American government and the corporation as some kind of progressive triumph. The 
notion of constraint for Sicilia focuses on the increased power of litigation to coerce 
corporations to behave in a socially desirable fashion. Yet Sicilia is only able to explain 
what is socially desirable in the context of industries that create products which can 
actually be harmful, or which have harmful byproducts and not to the amorphous ills of 
an uneven tax structure. This was secured through the legal concept of “enterprise 
liability” which relegated producers of products to bearing the brunt of the blame for the 
harm caused in the use of his products.98 His reliance on enterprise liability breaks down 
when applied to the oil industry and their tax privileges. The “harm” perpetuated by this 
system was not legally analogous to products that literally could hurt people. It was much 
more subtle.  
 
For Arthur Miller, writing in 1976, the real harm was the damages to 
Constitutional protections guaranteed to individuals. To focus on the assault on these tax 
breaks would be to miss the forest for the trees. He argues that the real effect on tort law 
of the increasing appearance of corporate personalities was that the law itself was 
transformed into a “pressure-group device” bolstered, as well as fed, by corporate 
                                                        
97 Goodwyn, 133 
98 Lipartito and Sicilia, 211 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gigantism. Individuals would have to organize themselves into very large groups to 
compete with corporations on equal footing. Vogel corroborates this claim when he 
discusses the importance of corporate interests in determining state politics: “The more 
important reason public officials display so much deference to the preferences of 
corporate executives is that the economic viability of particular communities, regions, 
and the nation as a whole are largely dependent on the rate and location of corporate 
investment.”99 The complicity of the government in the growing power of the corporate 
entity is unavoidable, especially in the face of a civilian population unable to amass as 
much centralized control, authority or funding as the modern corporation. Through 
generous interpretations of corporate law in anti-trust proceedings and more generally in 
the sponsorship of such enterprise, the Supreme Court and legislators “permit the public 
to believe that something is being done about giant enterprise, while simultaneously 
allowing corporate managers to expand and operate almost at will.”100 This is especially 
troubling in the context of contemporary American civil society, because it makes it 
impossible for courts and legal institutions to untangle citizenship from its connection to 
corporate power which usurps the rights of citizenship from citizens themselves.  
 
If nothing else, the Tax Reform Act of 1969 displays this depressing dynamic.  
The hearings of 1969 changed, for a time, the way that Congress would treat the oil 
industry. Opponents of tax loopholes increasingly drew on a conceptualization of the 
“social good” as one in which tax breaks served a function to a society larger than the 
individual industries that they benefited. They argued that the proper relationship 
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between the government and the corporation should not be as intertwined and complicit 
as was clearly the case in the ABC transaction and the highly profitable mineral depletion 
allowance. If anything, the corporation was to be held at the same distance from 
government as regular citizens, if not further. As argued in this essay, Congress made a 
distinction between the big and small business based on what was an acceptable level of 
state adjudication in a profit-seeking enterprise. The assault on the ABC transaction was 
one that managed to expunge a notorious tax-break from the tax code. Even though it 
principally affected the independents, we have seen how this was not a direct assault on 
the independent companies similar to the attack on mineral depletion directly affected the 
majors. The independents lost out on a cheap source of financing and lost the ability to 
artificially create losses. Legislators had, however, created a precedent to attack the 
favorite tax break of the majors in the future. 
 
The starvation from petroleum that the oil industry threatened in 1969 did not 
actually occur and set the stage for further attacks on not just foreign depletion but also 
the foreign tax credit that majors still managed to hold onto in 1969. The 1969 tax act 
was an odd moment in American history that was to be increasingly rare as the century 
progressed. It was a moment where Congress genuinely attempted to formulate an 
understanding of how to account for the corporation as a form of collective property 
holding in America. The movement had some small success, but in the long run, did little 
to solve the problem of how to deal with the corporation in America. In fact, by 
rhetorically confusing individuals and corporations, reforms might have only blurred 
further an already indistinct relationship. 
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Appendix I:  
 
Depletion 
The way depletion usually works in a financial setting is to compensate the 
owners of capital for the fact that the machines that they use inevitably become less 
effective. Depletion always assigns a fictional amount by which a machine’s value has 
been eroded through use for a fixed period, and this value is subtracted as though t were a 
cost when calculating net income. The purpose of the depletion is to ensure that owners 
of such equipment pay taxes in accordance with the fact that they will eventually have to 
purchase new machinery to replace the machinery that is depleted through use. The 
government is sensitive to this requirement of business. By not depleting the value of the 
machines, their taxable incomes would be artificially inflated. In a sense, depletion 
allows firms to not pay taxes on machinery.  
 
The mineral depletion allowance sought to treat oil properties as if they were the 
same kinds of machines. By foregoing a portion of income that would ordinarily be 
subject to governmental confiscation, the government was actively subsidizing oil 
companies, especially since large incomes from some fields could completely offset the 
income from other fields. Another crucial difference between the mineral depletion and 
the standardized depletion accorded to machinery was that standard depletion could only 
be claimed for finite periods in time, whereas percentage (mineral) depletion could be for 





The Net Limitation was a statutory limit placed on the amount of depletion the 
owner of an oil property could claim. The limitation basically allowed the owner of the 
oil property to deduct 27½ percent of their gross incomes (total revenues less total costs) 
provided that the total amount claimed did not exceed fifty percent of net income (gross 
income less depreciation, dividends etc). The best way to illustrate this is with an 
example.  
 
Thus if the oil property generated $1,000,000 of gross income, the statutory 
depletion would be $275,000. However, if the net income of the property were $500,000, 
then the maximum depletion that could be claimed would be $250,000. Because the 
mineral depletion relied on the concept of income for it to work, he legal debates that 
ensued, therefore, centered on how to characterize whether the producer of oil was, in 
fact, receiving income. 
 
ABC Transaction 
The transaction was so named because it involved three distinct parties: A – the 
seller of an oil property, B – the buyer of the oil property, and, C – the buyer of a 
production payment. A basically would split the oil property into two transactional units: 
1) the “operating interest” which would be sold to B, and, 2) the “production payment” or 
“carved-out production payment”, including an interest factor, which would be sold to C. 
The “operating interest” allowed B to extract the minerals on the entire property. B would 
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then have to make regular payments to the owner of the production payment (C) out of 
the oil that he had extracted from the property. The main attraction of the ABC 
transaction was that it allowed B to purchase the entire property at a low price with very 
little cash and allowed C to reap very substantial tax savings.  
 
A highly simplified ABC transaction might work in the following way. The oil 
property might be worth $3 million. A would sell the operating interest to B for $1 
million and a production payment to C for $2 million. A emerged from the transaction $3 
million richer. B walked away with an oil property worth $3 million only having put $1 
million on the table; however, he incurred a “debt” of $2 million in the form of the 
production payment that he would have to pay off to C in regular installments with the oil 
received from the property. Thus as the owner of the production payment, C received the 
income from these oil payments at regular intervals. C usually financed the purchase of 
the production payment with a bank loan. Figure 1, below, summarizes the flow of funds 
in the transaction.  
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The point of the transaction for C is crucial to understand. Even though C earned income 
from the regular production payments in excess of the interest rate it paid to the bank, the 
transaction created net losses for C because of the way the depletion allowance worked. 
This was the desired outcome, because it allowed C to reduce the size of his taxable 
income and thus reduce the final amount of taxes that he would pay.  
 
It was precisely this co-ownership of an economic interest that created the market 
for production payments. The purchaser of the production payment was able to receive 
income from the oil property and deduct a portion of that income from his overall gross 
income, thus reducing his taxable income. In his Journal of Taxation article entitled 
“How to Determine the Tax Saving That Makes an ABC Deal Worthwhile,” E.L Minyard 
illustrates this tax-saving empirically. He advised his readers that if they had “substantial 
ordinary income which [was] not expected to decrease materially in the next few years, 














payment began to produce a taxable profit, could sell the payment for the unpaid 
principal balance” and that this profit would incur “favorable capital gain treatment.”101 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